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In his Historia calamitatum Abelard recalls a dramatic
confrontation between Alberic of Rheims and himself. During the
Council of Soissons (1121) Abelard's Theologίa 'Summi boni\ at Al-
beric's insistence, was being examined for doctrinal errors. Alberic,
carrying a copy of the work, approached the combative Abelard and
declared how startled he was by something he found in the book: since
God begot God and there was only one God, how could Abelard deny
that God had begotten Himself? Alberic didn't want any rational justi-
fication the suspected Abelard might want to provide for such a denial.
Nor did he even want to know what the wandering teacher from Palais
meant. He sought solely the words of the authority on which Abelard
based himself. The undaunted Abelard told Alberic to turn over the
folio of the work he was carrying. He would find there what he wanted.
There indeed, to the consternation of Alberic and the disciples who
accompanied him, the words from the opening chapter of Augustine's
De Trinitate both justified Abelard's denial and undermined the thesis
Alberic had taught for years.1 For Augustine said:
1. Peter Abelard Histoήa calamitatum, ed. Jacques Monfrin (Paris: Vrin. 1959), p.
84, line 751 to p. 85, line 781. Compare Theologia 'Summi bora1 2.2, ed. Heinrich
Ostlender, BGPTM 35/2-3 (Munster i. W.: Aschendorff, 1939), pp. 46-47.
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He who thinks God to be of such power that He begot His very self errs
all the more because not only does God not exist in this way, but neither
do spiritual or corporeal creatures: for there exists nothing at all which
begets itself.2
Abelard's refutation of Alberic's understanding of "Deus genuit
Deum" (God begot God) is further recorded in Books 3 and 4 of
Theologia Christiana.^ Through the Summa sententiarum^ this Alberto
Abelard debate found its way into the fourth distinction of Peter
Lombard's first book of the Sentences: "Hie quaeritur utrum conce-
dendum sit quod Deus se genuerit."5
Gilbert de la Porree's denial of the truth of the logically linked
proposition "Deus est Trinitas"6 not only provoked discussion at the
2. Peter Abelard Histoήa calamitatum (Monfrin 84-765-85.769). See also Augus-
tine De Trinitate 1.1.1 (PL 42:820; CCSL 50:28).
3. Peter Abelard Theofogia Christiana 3, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert, CCCM 12
(Turnhout: Brepols, 1969), p. 235, line 1287 to p. 236, line 1334, together with 4.70-
136, especially no. 78, and 4.138-158 (Buytaert 297.1024-334.2184 and 335.2193-
344.2532).
4. Summa sentenάarum 1.8 (PL 171:1087 and PL 176:60-61).
5. Peter Lombard Sententiae 1.4.1, ed. Ignatius Brady (Grottaferrata: CSB, 1971),
p. 77, line 21.
6. Gilbert Porretanus Commentaήum in Boethii De praedicatione trium personarum
(PL 64:1309): "Unde et auctor recte infert dicens: Quo fit ut nee Trinitas quidem
de Deo substantialiter praedicetur." Compare Nicholas M. Haring, "Notes on the
Council and Consistory of Rheims (1148)," Mediaeval Studies 28 (1966): 39-59.
Damien Van den Eynde contends that Lombard's critique of Gilbert de la Porree
and his followers in Sent. 1.4.2 lacks an inner connection with 1.4.1. See his "Essai
chronologique sur Γoeuvre litteraire de Pierre Lombard," in Miscellanea Lombardiana
(Novarra: Istituto geografico De Agostini, 1957), p. 56. While not denying that the
attack on the Porretani may have been added to an earlier redaction of the Sentences,
I would suggest that Praepositinus and other theologians show a closer interior link
between the contents of the two chapters through their common dependence on an
adequate theory regarding the supposition of terms, especially the suppositio of the
term 'Deus'. For a fuller study of the connection between Peter Lombard and the
school of Gilbert in the area of language, see Nicholaus M. Haring, "Petrus Lombar^
dus und die Sprachlogik in der Trinitatslehre der Porretanerschule," in Miscellanea
Lombardiana, pp. 113-127. For a broad historical perspective on Gilbert and his
contemporaries, see H. C. Van Elswijk, Gilbert Porreta, sa vie, son oeuvre, sa pensέe,
Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense 33 (Leuven: Spicΐlegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1966),
pp. 321-364 and Lauge Olaf Nielsen, Theology and Philosophy in the Twelfth Century
(Leiden: Brill, 1982).
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consistories of Paris (1147) and Rheims (1148), it also fostered logical
and linguistic precisions regarding the supposition of terms by late
twelfth-century theologians, such as Praepositinus.7
When Joachim of Flora attacked Peter Lombard's claim in Sen-
tences 1.5 that "Pater non genuit divinam essentiam" and "Divina
essentia non genuit Filium," not only did Joachim draw to his own
teaching the condemnation of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), he
also stimulated early thirteenth-century theologians, such as William
of Auxerre, to make further distinctions concerning the suppositio
terminorumβ
In brief, although modern students of medieval supposition theory
have, for the most part, based themselves on medieval logic treatises,
there is a rich parallel source for studying the development of the
theory of the supposition of terms to be found in theological writ-
ings. For, especially in dealing with the Trinity and the Incarnation,
theologians had to clarify their statements, explaining in each case
whether they were speaking about the divine essence or about all or
one of the divine persons, or whether they were speaking about Christ
as God or Christ as man. Did they develop a certain consistency in
their theory of reference or supposition? Did they find some logical
principles that governed their use of language and could be applied
to each proposition dealing with the Trinity? If they did, would such
a theory also be applicable in statements concerning the Incarnate
Son, where one is dealing with only one person, but a person with a
divine and a human nature?
If we wanted to examine the success of such an endeavor, even
in one medieval author, it would require a complete search of all
the propositions dealing with the Trinity or the Incarnation in that
author's writings. We would have to see if there were explicit or
implicit rules governing the referents in each of his statements. Then
we would have to see if these rules could be applied in all the other
areas of his theological or philosophical discourse in a consistent way.
7. Praepositinus Summa 1, as in Paris, B. N. lat. 14,526, fol. 4 r a ' v a.
8. Compare Enchiridion Symbolorum, ed. Denzinger-Bannwart-Schδnmetzer, 32d
ed. (Barcelona: Herder, 1963), nos. 431-432 [803-807], and William of Auvergne
Summa aurea 1.4.4/6, ed. Jean Ribaillier (Paris and Grottaferrata: Editions du CNRS,
1980), pp. 44-49, 56-57.
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Our present task is a much more modest one. We are writing this
essay as an introduction to a particular text of Walter Chatton. We
will be looking at one particular theological case and showing how
a small number of Chatton's predecessors dealt with that case and
how they tried to develop a theory of supposition to handle it. The
particular theological case is found in Lombard's Sentences 1.4 where,
picking up the Alberic-Abelard debate of 1121, the Magister Sen*
tentiarum examines the truth of the proposition "Deus genuit Deum."
Since the Sententiae of Lombard became the official theology textbook
at Paris and Oxford before the middle of the thirteenth century, and
every medieval baccalareus had as one option to present a commentary
on Lombard's work as a partial requirement for becoming a Master of
Theology, the commentaries baccalarii wrote on distinction 4 contain
an alternate source for their theories of supposition.9
In order to understand better the text of Walter Chatton's Lectura
1.4.1.1-2, which we have edited here, we will examine the Sen-
tences of Bonaventure (who verbally resembles William of Ockham,
Chatton's chief opponent in this text), Praepositinus's Summa (he is
attacked by both Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent, Ockham's
chief opponents), the Sentences and Summa theologiae of Aquinas, the
Summa quaestionum ordinariarum of Henry of Ghent, and William of
Ockham's Scriptum in I Sententiarum.
BONAVENTURE
Bonaventure, in 1.4.1.1 of his Sentences, asks the ques-
tion: Should we concede the statement "Deus genuit Deum"?10 What
does 'Deus' stand for in such a proposition: (1) the divine essence,
(2) all three persons of the Trinity, or (3) one of the persons? Such a
statement ("Deus genuit Deum") has been granted as true, according
to Bonaventure, by the magistri and the sancύ. But we have to get
9. For an introduction to the development of the theory of the supposition of
terms in the medieval period according to logical works, see Brown, "Walter Burleigh's
Treatise De suppositionibus and its Influence on William of Ockham," Franciscan Studies
32 (1972): 15-64.
10. Bonaventure Sent. 1.4.[l].l, ed. CSB, OperaOmnia 1 (Quaracchi: CSB, 1882),
pp. 97-99.
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some things clear if we wish to appreciate exactly what they granted
when they admitted the statement as true. Or did they mean that
the divine essence begot God? Did they mean the Trinity begot God?
In other words, what is the supposition of 'Deus' and 'Deum' in the
proposition "Deus genuit Deum"? What do 'Deus' and 'Deum' refer
to in this statement?
Bonaventure tells us as a first rule that a concrete term (Όeus'
or 'albus') and an abstract term ('deltas' or 'albedo') have different
references. The abstract term stands for the form or essence: 'deltas'
refers to the divine essence, 'albedo' refers to the form of whiteness.
The concrete term stands for the subject in whom or in which the
essence or form exists: 'album' refers to a white man or a white swan,
a subject in whom or in which whiteness is present, 'deltas' to a
divine person in whom the divine essence is present. The need for
such a distinction is clear: we could say rightly "albus currit," but not
"albedo currit."
Secondly, if we further examine the concrete term ('Deus', 'albus')
and find that such a term has many referents ('Deus': 'Pater', 'Fi-
lms', 'Spiritus Sanctus'; 'albus': 'homo', 'cygnus'), then if no specific
reference is indicated, we should give the benefit of the doubt to
whichever one would make the statement true. For example, when
someone says "homo currit," the statement is true if any man at all is
running. So, we should not focus on the men who are not running.
As long as someone is running, the statement "homo currit" is true.
From these two rules Bonaventure arrives at this conclusion con-
cerning the proposition "Deus genuit Deum." According to the first
rule: 'Deus' is concrete, and so although the divine essence is present
in each person of the Trinity, still the term 'Deus' (as well as 'Deum')
refers not to the divine essence, but to a person. Then, according to
the second rule: If one person, say the Father, begot another person,
say the Son, then if 'Deus' stands for the Father and 'Deum' for the
Son, the proposition is true. Unless 'Deus' is limited in its referents
to stand only for the Son or the Holy Spirit, or 'Deum' is limited to
supposit only for the Father or the Holy Spirit, then the statement
"Deus genuit Deum" does not have concrete terms that are limited
to specific referents for whom it would be false to say "Deus genuit
Deum." As long as there is a referent ('Pater') for whom 'Deus' truly
stands, and as long as there is a referent ('Filium') for whom 'Deum'
truly stands, then the proposition "Deus genuit Deum" is true. This is
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the ground of meaning on which Bonaventure agrees with the magίstri
and sancti who accept the statement as true.
Notice that Bonaventure, in this quaestio^ does not elaborate
a theory. He simply borrows a few rules12 which help him solve a
concrete problem. He says that the concrete term 'Deus' stands for
a person, but he does not say why it stands for a person. Does the
term Όeus' by itself always stand for a person? Or does it stand for a
person in this particular proposition because of the verb 'genuit' ? As
long as he does not further specify the grounds supporting his rules,
he will appear, as we shall see later, to be saying the same thing as
William of Ockham. In fact, however, Bonaventure does not provide
us with the precise ground for his decision that "Deus" stands for a
person. When Ockham does, it brings out their differences.
THOMAS AQUINAS
Thomas's discussion of the same proposition "Deus ge-
nuit Deum" provides a more theoretical discussion of supposition.13
He focuses on the opinion of Praepositinus, ^  who follows Gilbert
of la Porree.15 For Praepositinus Όeus' by its natural supposition,16
i.e., taken simply as a term without considering the role it plays in
11. Bonaventure, in 1.4.[1] 4, does ask explicitly "utrum hoc nomen Όeus* pro
persona supponat, vel pro natura?" In response, Bonaventure does not develop a
theory of supposition, but rather notes that Όeus' is a unique term, "quia habet
naturam termini communis et termini discreti: termini communis propter plurali-
tatem suppositorum, termini discreti ratione formae immultiplicabilis—quod proprie
supponit tarn naturam quam personam" (CSB 1:102-103).
12. Bonaventure Sent. 1.4.[l].l (CSB 1:98).
13. Thomas Aquinas Summa theol. 1.38.4-
14. Thomas Aquinas Summa theol. 1.38.4-
15. Thomas Aquinas Summa theol. 1.38.4-
16. 'Natural supposition' in the era of Praepositinus is the supposition a term has
just on its own. In the latter part of the thirteenth century, supposition will become
defined as the property of a term in a proposition, and then natural supposition
will be set aside. It does reappear, however, with a different meaning in some later
authors. See Logica ιAά rudium\ ed. Lambertus M. de Rijk (Nijmegen: Ingenium,
1981), p. 51, no. 110.
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a proposition, stands for the divine essence. In a certain statement
it might be limited by the predicate or the context to stand for a
particular person. In the statement "Deus genuit Deum," for example,
Όeus' has its natural supposition restricted to stand for the persona
Pαtris. For Praepositinus, then, Όeus' naturally stands for the divine
essence, but can in a particular proposition, like "Deus genuit Deum,"
stand not for the divine essence but for the Father.
Aquinas is critical of this position of Praepositinus.17 It is true,
Aquinas argues, that "Deus" and "deitas" both signify the divine
essence. Still when we speak of what some term stands for, what
its supposit is, we must consider not only its significate (Όeus' and
'deitas' both signify the divine essence), but also consider the modus
significandiy the manner in which each word signifies what it signifies.
Now Όeus' and 'deitas' both signify the divine essence, but they do so
in different ways. 'Deus' signifies that essence "ut in habente ipsam" (as
found in a subject or supposit), whereas 'deitas' signifies that essence as
an absolute form. Όeus' by its concrete mode of signifying signifies the
divine essence in a different way than 'deltas', and therefore properly
supposits or stands for the divine essence not in its absolute form but
as it is present in a supposit.
Aquinas adds to this, in second place, Όeus' can sometimes prop'
erly stand for a supposit, as in the proposition "Deus genuit Deum." In
other words, the concrete term Όeus' can properly at times supposit
for the essentia, ut in habente ipsam and it can also at times properly
stand for the habens essentiam or supposit itself.18
Finally, if Όeus' can stand for the essentia in habente ipsam in some
cases and for the habens essentiam or supposit in other instances,
then when and why does it properly stand for the former or the
latter? Aquinas explains that Όeus' properly stands for the essentia in
habente ipsam when it is used in a proposition in which the predicate
is affirmed of the subject Όeus' by reason of the form of divinity that
is signified by Όeus' or 'deitas'. This is, for instance, the case in the
proposition "Deus creat." The triune God creates not because He is
God the Father, or God the Son, or God the Holy Spirit, but because
17. Compare Thomas Aquinas Summa theol. 1.39.4-
18. Thomas Aquinas Summa theol. L39.4.
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of His divine form, nature, or essence. This, however, is not the case
in the proposition "Deus generat." In this instance, God generates
not because of His divinity but because of His paternity. In formal
terms, Aquinas declares:
"Per se [Deus] supponit pro natura communi [in habente ipsam],
sed ex adiuncto determinatur eius suppositio ad personam."19
HENRY OF GHENT
Henry of Ghent deals with "Deus generat Deum" in his
Summa 54.3.20 For him, 'Deus' signifies the deity, which is also what
'deltas' signifies, just as 'album' signifies whiteness, as 'albedo' does.
So 'Deus', as far as what it signifies is concerned, signifies the same
thing as 'deltas'. Their mode of signification, however, is different,
since 'Deus' signifies per modum suppositi—or, in John Damascene's
terminology,21 'Deus' signifies the natura ut in habente ipsam—whereas
'deitas' signifies the natura per modum formae absolutae.22
Henry continues. Although 'Deus' signifies per modum supposing
it does not signify any supposit—not one, not many—because even
though 'Deus' is concrete, still it signifies something absolute in an
absolute way and after the manner of something absolute, whereas
all the divine supposits are relativa. For sure, 'Deus' has a different
modus significandi from 'deltas', but 'Deus' also has a different modus
significandi from 'persona' or 'Pater'. 'Deus' signifies the divine essence
in habente ipsam per modum absolutL 'Deus' does not signify per modum
relativiy and therefore it primarily and principally stands for the essence
(in habente ipsam) rather than for a person. Only when a qualifying
adjunct is added can 'Deus' stand for a person, and such an adjunct
(genuit) is added in the statement "Deus genuit Deum." In this case,
therefore, 'Deus' supposits for the persona Pαtris, and thus understood,
the proposition can be admitted.23
19. Thomas Aquinas Summa theol. 1.39.4.
20. Henry of Ghent Summa quaestionum ordinaήarum 54.3 (Paris, 1520), 2:82Γ.
21. Compare Henry of Ghent Summa 54.3 (2:81V).
22. Henry of Ghent Summa 54.3 (2:81V).
23. Henry of Ghent Summa 54.3 (2:81V).
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WILLIAM OF OCKHAM
In his Commentary on the Sentences,^ William of Ock>
ham faces off with Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent. He argues
that every concrete term has to stand for that in which its form is
found, as is clear from 'albus' in the proposition "Homo est albus."
Here 'albus' does not stand for the form of whiteness, but for the
subject of that form. In the same way, when someone says "Homo
est filius Dei," 'homo' does not stand for human nature, but for the
person sustaining human nature. This is also the case in regard to
'Deus' in the proposition "Deus genuit Deum": 'Deus' does not stand
for the Deity itself, neither in forma absoluta, nor in habente ipsam, but
stands rather for a divine suppositum or person. Furthermore, this is not
due to any qualifying adjunct in the proposition "Deus genuit Deum"
which restricts Όeus' to stand for a person. 'Deus', as a concrete term,
in a proposition where it stands for its significate, stands by that very
fact for a divine person.
What explains this difference between Ockham, on the one hand,
and Thomas and Henry, on the other? There are a number of issues
involved. First, Ockham's theory of signification is different from that
of Thomas and Henry. Thomas and Henry follow the traditional
view flowing from Boethius's explanation of what Aristotle declares in
Perihermenias, that "words are signs of passions in the soul."25 Boethius,
following Porphyry, states that: "[although verbal expressions signify
things and concepts, principally they signify concepts and signify by
a secondary signification the things which the intellect itself grasps
by means of the concepts."26 Aquinas, walking in Boethius's foot'
steps, explains:
'Passions in the souΓ must be understood here as concepts in the intellect,
and names, verbs, and speech, signify these conceptions of the intellect
immediately according to the teaching of Aristotle. They cannot immedi'
ately signify things, as is clear from the mode of signifying, for the name
'man' signifies human nature in abstraction from singulars; hence it is
impossible that it immediately signify a singular man. The Platonists for
24. William Ockham Scriptum in 1 Sententiarum 4.1, ed. Girard I. Etzkorn, Opera
theobgica 3 (St. Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute, 1977), pp. 3-17.
25. Aristotle On Interpretation 1 (16a3-4).
26. Boethius in librum De interpretatione, editio altera 1 "De signis" (PL 64:407C).
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this reason held that it signified the separated idea of man. But because
in Aristotle's teaching man in the abstract does not really subsist, but is
only in the mind, it was necessary for Aristotle to say that vocal sounds
signify the conceptions of the intellect immediately and things by means
of them.27
Now Ockham's theory of signification is clearly different from the
more traditional Boethian one. He writes,
Names of this type 'Man', 'animal', 'lion' and universally all first-intention
names primarily and principally signify the things themselves outside the
mind. The word 'man' primarily signifies all men and the word 'animal'
primarily signifies all animals. And the same holds for other words of
this type.28
Since all concrete first-intention words primarily and principally sig-
nify things outside the mind, and there are, for Ockham, no uni-
versal things, such words must primarily and principally signify not
essences distinct in any way from the individuals, but the individuals
themselves. In short, Ockham's theory of signification concerning
concrete terms, namely that they primarily and principally signify
things, is linked to his theory of universals. For him, there are no
universal things, nor any universal natures in things that in some
real way are distinct from individuals. When you couple his theory
of signification with his theory of universals, the result is that, since
a concrete term primarily and principally signifies a thing and the
only things are individuals, then concrete terms must primarily and
principally signify individuals.
If we swing back to the theological context of Sentences 1.4, we can
see Ockham's consistency.29 As 'man', 'animal', and 'lion' primarily
and principally signify men, animals, and lions, that is individuals, so
'Deus' signifies primarily and principally the divine persons. And just
as 'man' does not specify Socrates, Plato, or Cicero, so 'Deus' does
not specify Father, Son, or Holy Spirit. Still, 'Deus' primarily and
27. Thomas Aquinas Super Perihermenias 2.5, in Aristotle: On Interpretation, trans.
Jean Osterle (Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Pr., 1962), p. 25.
28. William Ockham Expositio in librum Perihermenias 2.8.12, ed. Angelus Gamba-
tese and Brown, Opera phifosophica 2 (St. Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute, 1978),
p. 502.
29. William Ockham Scriptum in I Sent. 4.1 (Etzkorn 12).
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principally signifies a person, not the divine essence, whether that
essence be considered absolutely or as present in a supposit.
Although first-intention names primarily and principally signify
individuals outside the mind and stand for or supposit for such individ-
uals, they can in certain propositions have their supposition restricted
by a qualifying adjunct.30 For instance, in the propositions "Man is
a species" or "'Man' is a one-syllable word," the term 'man' is not
used significatively or according to what it primarily and principally
signifies. In brief, the primary form of supposition for Ockham is per-
sonal supposition, the type of supposition a term has in a proposition
when it stands for its significate. In the case of concrete names, the
principal and primary significate is the individual or supposit; it is for
this supposit that a concrete term stands when it is a case of personal
supposition. In this he differs from Thomas, Henry, and many others
for whom simple supposition is primary. For them simple supposition
takes place when a term in a proposition stands for its significate, by
which they mean the essence—either taken absolutely or as present in
an individual or supposit. Personal supposition is, for them, secondary:
it takes place when a term stands for one of the inferiors contained
under the essence or significate.
The primacy of personal supposition within Ockham's framework
flows from his theory of signification and his theory of universals.
Once you accept his position that concrete words signify things and
join to it the thesis that the only things are individuals, Ockham's
supposition theory, with the primacy of personal supposition, follows
of necessity. It is from this viewpoint and from these assumptions that
Ockham criticizes Thomas and Henry. Looking at Thomas's Summa
1.39.4, Ockham states: "In eadem quaestione non tantum realiter sed
vocaliter idem condedit et negat."31 Why?
Thomas said "ex modo significandi" Όeus' can stand for a person,
then later added that Όeus' stands per se for the divine essence and
per adiunctum for a person. In Ockham's eyes that is a contradiction.
When a terms stands for something precisely by reason of an adjunct,
then it does not supposit for it by reason of its modus significandi.
For Ockham the concrete term has a way of signifying that points
30. William Ockham Scriptum in I Sent. 4.1 (Etzkorn 8-11).
31. William Ockham Scriptum in I Sent. 4-1 (Etzkorn 5-6).
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primarily to the supposit; it does not need an adjunct, therefore, to
stand for the supposit. For Ockham, it needs an adjunct not to stand
for the supposit.
From Ockham's viewpoint, Henry of Ghent's position is likewise
faulty. A concrete term has to supposit for that in which its form is
found: 'album' doesn't supposit for whiteness but for the subject in
which whiteness is found. The abstract term 'albedo' signifies white-
ness. The concrete term 'album' is more complex: it is not an absolute
term, but a connotative one. 'Album' signifies one thing directly and
another indirectly. Directly it signifies a subject; indirectly it signifies
the whiteness present in the subject. The same holds for 'Deus'. It is
a concrete term that directly signifies a supposit, indirectly the divine
nature or essence that exists in the subject. Its primary significate,
however, is the subject or supposit; only secondarily and indirectly
does it signify the divine essence.
Henry's theory of signification and his theory of universals support
the opposite position. The primary significate for him is the essence.
He even refuses to speak of a secondary or indirect significate or
consignificate. "Unde hoc nomen 'Deus' non significat nisi deitatem
quam significat hoc nomen 'deltas', quemadmodum 'album' significat
solam albedinem sicut et hoc nomen 'albedo', ita quod hoc nomen
'Deus', quantum est ex parte rei significatae, non significat aliud quam
significetur hoc nomine 'deltas'."32
WALTER CHATTON
Walter Chatton and William of Ockham spent the early
1320s teaching together.33 Chatton knew Ockham's works well and
criticized them frequently. Ockham's theory of supposition was no
exception: Chatton criticized it in the fourth distinction of his Lectura
in I SententiarurΠy which we have edited below.
32. Henry of Ghent Summa 543 (2:81v-82r)
33. Compare Stephen F. Brown, "Walter Chatton's Lectura and William of Ock*
ham's Quaestiones in libros Physicorum Aristotelis," in Essays Honoring Allan B. Wolter
(St. Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute, 1986), pp. 81-115.
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The chief difficulty Chatton found with Ockham in this quaestio
centers on the general theory of supposition held by the Venerable
Inceptor. For Ockham, personal supposition, as we have seen, takes
place when a term supposits for its significate, the individual it stands
for. In the proposition Ή o m o currit," 'homo' signifies and stands for
a real individual man. Since universals are, for Ockham, words or
concepts, never things distinct in some real or formal manner from
the individuals, simple supposition takes place when a term stands
for a concept. The term 'man' in the statement "Man is a species"
does not stand for a universal reality or a common nature in reality
but for a universal or common concept. In brief, Ockham's account
of supposition follows his theory of universals.
Chatton's theory of universals is different from Ockham's, and this
is manifest in his definitions of the different types of supposition. Sim-
ple supposition, for Chatton, is manifold. Sometimes a term stands,
as it does for Ockham, for a concept or a written or spoken word. At
other times, however, we have cases of simple supposition where a
term stands for a thing; here Chatton differs from Ockham.3 4
For Chatton, terms both in simple and in personal supposition can
stand for things. Yet, he is careful not to make his distinction between
simple and personal supposition follow a form of realism where he
would claim that a term taken simply, or in simple supposition,
stands for a universal thing, whereas a term taken personally, or in
personal supposition, stands for a singular thing. He therefore frames
his definitions in the following words:
Personal supposition takes place when a term so stands for a singular
individual that the predicate of that proposition can be verified of a proper
concept of that thing.35
The type of simple supposition that stands for a thing is that by which
the subject of a proposition so stands for a thing that is really singular
that the predicate of that proposition is not capable of being verified of
a proper concept of that thing.36
34- See the edition below, nos. 8 and 6-6.1.
35. See no. 6, below.
36. See no. 6, below.
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Chatton takes great pains to explain the theory of universals which
supports-*? this theory of supposition,^ perhaps because it comes so
close to the position of Henry of Harclay, which Ockham attacked
in his Scήptum in I Sententiarum 2.7.39 Furthermore, Chatton seems
aware that if for him a common term sometimes signifies a reality,
and not just a common concept or a common spoken or written word,
he might be vulnerable to Ockham's struggle against any claim that
a thing can be the subject or predicate of a proposition. Chatton
phrases Ockham's doubt in the following words:
I prove that the subject of this proposition "Man is a species" does not
supposit for a thing outside the mind, since 'to be a species' is a second
intention just as 'to be predicated of many' is a second intention, and a
second intention does not belong to a thing that is signified.40
Chatton answers this objection by distinguishing between the ad-
missible and inadmissible meanings that can be given to the phrase
'predicable of many'. If one intends to imply that some thing outside
the mind really through its proper entity can be the predicate of
a proposition, then certainly such an outside thing cannot be the
predicate of a proposition. If, however, you mean by a thing being
predicated that a thing outside the mind that is predicated of many is
signified per se and primo by the predicate, then Chatton claims that
this is admissible. For it is true, Chatton argues, that human nature,
for instance, is signified per se and primo by the concept of man or by
the definition 'rational animal', and that such a concept or definition
can be predicated of many.41
The traditional question of Sentences 1.4 "utrum Detis generet
Deum?" allows Chatton to make these clarifications concerning his
definitions of supposition and his theory of universals. On the tradi-
tional question, nonetheless, there is no serious objection to Ockham's
own answer. Chatton's disagreements are minor; they seem strained.
37. See no. 6, below.
38. See no. 6, below.
39. William Ockham Scήptum in I Sententiarum 2.7, ed. Brown and Gedeon Gal,
Opera theologica 2 (St. Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute, 1970), pp. 227-248.
40. See no. 7.1, below.
41. See no. 8.2, below.
MEDIEVAL SUPPOSITION THEORY 135
Both he and Ockham hold that 'Deus' and Όeum' have personal
supposition in the proposition "Deus generet Deum." Since there is
no essential difference in the two men's views of personal supposition
itself, there is no serious disagreement on the question inherited
from Abelard.42
Chatton's text that is edited below provides one example of the
theological context within which he and other medieval thinkers de-
veloped their theories of supposition. Any careful reader of Ockham's
Summa logίcae would see how often this same example and many other
theological examples served as major challenges to the logical theory
of supposition. Logic rules and theory to a very great extent were
developed to solve such theological challenges. Much broader studies




[WALTER CHATTON/LECTURA IN I
SENT. 4.1.1-2]
[1.0] Circa distinctionem quartam quaero utrum Deus
generet1 Deum:
[1.1] Quod non, quia si sic, aut igitur haec esset vera per se aut per
accidens. Non primum, quia sic omnis Deus generaret Deum. Non
per accidens, quia tune sibi non repugnaret non generare Deum, et
per consequens sibi non repugnaret esse sine Filio Deo.2
[1.2] Secundo, quia omnis Deus est necesse esse. SP igitur Deus
generaret Deum, tune necesse esse generaret necesse esse. Quod fal-
sum, quia tune necesse esse4 necessario exigeret aliud a se ad hoc
42. See nos. 9.1-15.4, below.
1. generet/generat F (= Florence, Bibl. Naz. Cent. MS Conv. soppr C.5.357)
2. Deo/idem P (= Paris, Bibi. Nat. MS lat. 15, 886)
3. Si/quia F
4. esse/est P
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quod esset, et per consequens illo alio circumscripto ipsum non esset,
igitur ipsum non est necesse esse.
[1.3] Contra: Pater generat Filium et uterque est Deus, igitur Deus
generat Deum.
[1.4] [DIVISIO QUAESTIONIS]
In ista quaestione unum supponitur et aliud quaeritur.
Supponitur enim quod in divinίs una persona generet aliam personam.
Et hoc supposito, quaeritur utrum ista propositio debeat concedi Όeus
generat Deum\ Admisso supposito tamquam certissimo ex fide, eo
quod Filius a Patre solo est non factus nee creatus sed genitus, in
ista tamen5 quaestione sunt duo facienda: primo enim aliqua sunt
tangenda de suppositione per quae quaestio solvetur; secundo est per
ilia respondendum ad quaestionem.
[2.0] [ARTICULUS PRIMUS]
[OPINIO GUILLELMI DE OCKHAM]
[2.1] Primus igitur articulus est tangere aliqua de supposi"
tione per quae solvetur quaestio. Et hie est opinio Ockham in Primo,
distinctionis 4 quaestione I. 6 Distinguit7 suppositiones in generali,
dicens quod suppositio variatur dupliciter: quia aliquando Variatur ex
hoc quod supponit pro alio et alio et aliquando variatur ex hoc quod
supponit aliter et aliter pro eodem.
[2.2] Suppositio isto secundo modo dividitur in suppositionem con^
fusam tantum et in suppositionem confusam et distributivam; suppose
tio primo modo dividitur in8 suppositionem simplicem, materialem et
personalem. Terminus enim in propositione vocali supponit simpliciter
5. tamen om. F
6. William Ockham Scήptum in librum primum Sententiarum 4.1, ed. Girard I.
Etzkorn, Opera theologίca 3 (St. Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute, 1977), pp. 7-13.
7. Distinguit/quae distinguit F
8. in suppositionem confusam et distributivam. . . in om.(hom.) P
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quando ilia vox supponit pro conceptu. Licet enim vox non significet
conceptum ilium, tamen quia ista vox et iste conceptus sunt signa sub-
ordinata respectu eiusdem significati,9 ideo respectu praedicati quod
convenit conceptui potest vox supponere pro conceptu, ut cum dicitur
Ήomo est species1. Sed in propositione in mente terminus supponit
simpliciter quando supponit pro se ipso et non pro re extra, ut patet
de ista Ήomo est species'—ut patet distinctionis 2 quaestionibus 4
et 5 et alibi frequenter.10 Terminus11 autem supponit materialiter
quando supponit pro ipsa voce, ut in ista Ήomo est nomen'. Sed




Contra ista: primo, non videtur verum quod vox sup-
ponat pro conceptu quern non significat, quia supponere pro aliquo
est stare loco sui sicut signum pro significato.13
[3.1] Item, si in ista propositione in voce Ήomo est species' subiec-
turn supponat pro conceptu, igitur idem est dicere quod Ίste conceptus
est species'. Sed istae voces quas formavi cum dixi "Iste conceptus"
vere significant ilium conceptum.
[3.2] Item, sicut conceptus dicitur species seu illud quod est prae-
dicabile de pluribus in propositione in conceptu, eadem ratione haec
vox "homo" dicetur species seu id14 quod praedicatur de pluribus in
propositione in voce. Qua ratione igitur in propositione in voce vox, si
supponat simpliciter, supponit pro conceptu communi, eadem ratione
in propositione in mente si conceptus supponat simpliciter supponit
9. signiίicati/signati P
10. William Ockham Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum 2.4-5, ed. Brown
and Gedeon Gal, Opera theofogica 2 (St. Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute, 1970),
pp. 135, 157. Compare Ockham Summa logicae 1.64, ed. Philotheus Boehner et al.,
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pro1 5 voce communi vel alio signo corporali, [ut] cum intellectus foi>
mat hanc 1 6 propositionem Ήaec vox "homo" praedicatur de pluribus'.
Et si ponas quod hoc non sit necesse, eadem ratione dicam quod ibi
non sit necesse.
[33] Secundo, non apparet verum quod in propositione in mente
quando conceptus supponit simpliciter supponit pro se ipso, quia tune
significant17 se ipsum; sed significari18 per intentionem est intelligi;
igitur iste conceptus est intentio sui ipsius, et per consequens omnis
cognitio intellectiva esset cognitio sui ipsius, quod falsum est, sicut
patet in prima quaestione Proίogί, articulo primo19—reducendo pri-
mum argumentum contra opinionem, et etiam de prima.20
[3.4] Item, eadem ratione in propositione in voce: si vox supponat
simpliciter, supponit pro se ipsa.
[3.5] Item, in propositione in mente conceptus potest supponere
materialiter ita bene sicut vox in propositione in voce; et hoc non
possent ipsi salvare nisi ponendo quod tune conceptus supponat pro
se multo magis quam21 quando supponit simpliciter.
[3.6] Item, in ista propositione Ήomo est species' vel in ista Ήomo
praedicatur de pluribus' "praedicari de pluribus" non convenit illi
subiecto pro se sed pro re, nam cum "homo" praedicatur in istis
fortes est homo', Tlato est homo', praedicatur de eis pro rebus extra
secundum eos.22 Igitur subiectum istius propositionis, si supponit pro
conceptu, hoc erit in ordine ad rem significatam; igitur licet immediate
supponat pro conceptu, tamen23 mediate supponit pro re signiftcata
per conceptum ilium. Aut igitur pro re communi, et istam negant;2^




19. Maria Elena Reina, "La prima questione del prologo del 'Commento alle
Sentenze' di Walter Catton," Rivista cήύca di storia della flosofia 25 (1970): 53.90-
59.281; also Chatton, Reportatio et Lectura super Sententias: Collatio ad librum primum
et probgus, ed. Joseph C. Wey (Toronto: PIMS, 1989) 24.213-27.279.
20. Namely of the first opinion reported and refuted there, that is, of the first
opinion of William Ockham.
21. quam om. P
22. Namely according to William Ockham, Summa logicae 1.64 (Boehner et al.
195).
23. tamen om. P
24- William Ockham Summa logicae 1.64 (Boehner et al. 195).
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aut pro re singulari. Tune mediate saltern supponit personaliter, quia
secundum eos 2 5 hoc est supponere personaliter: supponere pro sup-
posito reali significato.26 Igitur si supponat mediate pro illo individo
vel supposito, tune supponit personaliter mediate.
[3.7] Confirmo, quia cum dicitur quod Sortes praedicatur de uno
solo, quaero utrum subiectum supponat simpliciter vel materialiter
vel personaliter. N o n simpliciter, quia subiectum non est commune;
nee materialiter, quia stat significative. Si personaliter, igitur cum
suppositione personali stat quod immediate supponat pro conceptu et
mediate pro re significata per ilium.
[4.0] [OPINIO REDUCENS OMNEM
SUPPOSITIONEM AD SUPPOSITIONEM
PERSONALEM]
Quantum igitur ad istud diceret forte aliquis27 quod om-
nis suppositio est personalis, tarn suppositio simplex quam materialis,
quam etiam quaelibet alia, quia quilibet terminus supponens supponit
pro aliquo singulari quod significatur28 per ipsum. Aut enim supponit
pro re extra singulari quod significat;29 tune habetur intentum. Aut
significat30 conceptum aliquem et supponit pro illo: adhuc tune sup-
ponit pro una singulari qualitate sive ilia qualitas sit eadem cum ip-
somet conceptu supponente sive non sit eadem sibi, ut verius credo.3 1
Aut significat32 vocem unam et supponit pro ea sive ilia sit ea-
dem cum subiecto supponente sive non, adhuc supponit pro quadam
qualitate significata per ipsum. Et eodem modo de scrίpto arguendum
est, et etiam de quocumque alio signo.
25. William Ockham Summa bgicae 1.64 (Boehner et al. 195).
26. significato/signato P
27. This opinion, here presented as possible, will later be held by Peter of Mantua.
Compare Paul of Venice Logica magna: Tractatus de suppositionibus, ed. Alan R.




31. See Gedeon Gal, "Gualteri de Chatton et Guillelmi de Ockham controversia
de natura conceptus universalis," Franciscan Studies 27 (1967): 191-212.
32. significat/signat P
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[4.1] Diceretur igitur quod suppositio personalis sumitur dupliciter:
uno modo large pro suppositione qua terminus supponit pro re sin-
gulari signiftcata per ilium terminum. Et isto modo suppositio per-
sonalis non dividitur contra suppositionem simplicetn et materialem
sed est communis eis, quia omnis suppositio materialis vel simplex est
suppositio personalis isto modo et non e contra. Alio modo sumitur
suppositio personalis stricte, eo modo scilicet quo condividitur contra
suppositionem materialem et simplicem, et sic est suppositio qua
terminus33 supponit pro singulari significato per ipsum non mediante
suo signo sed immediate. Diceretur enim quod suppositio materialis
est quando terminus supponit pro signo aliquo non in ordine ad suum
significatum, sive in scripto, sive in propositione in voce, sive in
mente, ut in istis Ήomo est vox', 'Conceptus est qualitas'. Suppo-
sitio simplex est qua terminus supponit pro signo in ordine ad suum
significatum, sive in voce, sive in scripto sive in conceptu, ut in ista
Ήomo praedicatur de pluribus'. Sed suppositio personalis isto modo
est ilia qua3^ terminus supponit non pro signo rei sed pro re extra
significata35 per ipsum, ut in ista Ήomo currit*.
[5] [CONTRA ISTAM OPINIONEM]
Iste modus dicendi, licet posset sustineri, habet tamen
dubitationem: primo, quod non omnis suppositio sit suppositio person-
alis, sumendo36 earn generalissime, quia quando unus terminus sup-
ponit pro alio tertnino communi ista non est suppositio personalis, ut
in ista Ήomo praedicatur de pluribus'. Licet enim subiectum supponat
pro uno conceptu vel voce singulari in essendo, tamen supponit pro
illo conceptu vel voce quatenus est communis in significando, et per
consequens non est suppositio personalis.
[5.1 ] Secundo est dubium, quia sumendo37 suppositionem per-
sonalem stricte, isto38 modo, tune non videtur divisio suppositionis
33. terminus/res P
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sufficiens in simplicem, materialem, et personalem, sicut patet de ista
propositione 'Sortes praedicatur de uno solo\ Subiectum enim in ista
non videtur supponere aliquo istorum modorum, ut supra dictum est.39
Item, tune hie est suppositio simplex Ήomo est vox significativa';
et hie similiter 'Conceptus est qualitas cognitiva', quia subiectum
supponit pro signo in ordine ad significatum.
[5.2] Tertio est dubium in isto modo dicendi, quia termini multi
supponunt simpliciter et tamen supponunt pro re extra. Patet in
exemplis:
[5.3] Primum exemplum est de subiecto istius propositionis Ήomo
est substantia secunda', sicut habetur in Praedicamentis.*0 Si dicatur
quod subiectum istius supponit pro conceptu quia sensus propositionis
est quod de conceptu hominis sumpto significative praedicatur hoc
praedicatum "substania secunda"; contra:41 aeque dicam tibi quod in
ista propositione Ήomo currit' subiectum supponit pro conceptu, quia
denotatur quod de conceptu hominis sumpto significative praedicatur
hoc praedicatum "currere."
[5.4] Item, tune habetur propositum, quia si hoc praedicatum "se-
cunda substantia" sit verificabile de conceptu hominis significative
sumpto et non verificatur de conceptu hominis sumpto significative
secundum suppositionem personalem, igitur secundum suppositionem
simplicem.
[5.5] Item, subiectum huius propositionis Ήomo est secunda sub-
stantia' non minus supponit significative quam subiectum huius propo-
sitionis Ήomo non est in subiecto' iuxta dictum Aristotelis ibidem in
Praedicamentis42 ubi ponit proprietatem communem omni substantiae
tarn primae quam secundae: quod non sit in subiecto. Sed subiectum
istius propositionis Ήomo non est in subiecto1 stat significative pro
re extra ita bene sicut subiectum in ista 'Sortes non est in subiecto',
quia sicut dictum est 'non est in subiecto' est proprietas uniformiter
conveniens substantiae primae et secundae, igitur etc.
39. See above no. 3.7
40. Aristotle Categories 5 (2alO-17). Compare William Ockham Expositio in librum
Praedicamentorum Aristotelis 4, ed. Gedeon Gal, Opera phibsophica 2 (St. Bonaventure:
Franciscan Institute, 1978), pp. 162-171.
41. contra/est add. P
42. Aristotle Categories 5 (2a 10-17). Compare William Ockham Expositio in librum
Praedicamentorum Aristotelis 4 (Gal 149-154)-
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[5.6] Secundum exemplum est de subiecto istius propositionis
Ήomo est magis substantia quam animal'. Dicit enim Aristoteles
ibidem in Praedicamentis43 quod inter substantias secundas species est
magis substantia quam genus. Si dicatur quod subiectum huius sup-
ponit pro conceptu quia sensus propositionis est quod ad quaestionem
factam per quid de isto homine convenientius respondetur quod est
homo quam quod est animal. Contra: per istam rationem dicetur quod
animal rationale sit magis substantia quam homo, quia convenientius
respondetur quod est animal rationale quam quod est homo.
[5.7] Item, per istam propositionem Ήomo est magis substantia
quam animaΓ aut intelligitur quod haec sit magis vera Ήomo est sub-
stantia' quam haec 'Animal est substantia'; tune habetur propositum,
quia hie "homo" stat significative, igitur ibi. Aut intelligitur quod hoc
totale praedicatum "esse magis substantia quam animal" verificetur de
subiecto isto; adhuc tune habetur propositum, quia non verificatur de
isto subiecto pro quocumque signo rei, quia nullum signum est magis
substantia quam animal, igitur verificatur de subiecto illo significative
sumpto pro re extra. Unde breviter ilia propositio est vera et non pro
aliquo conceptu vel voce vel scripto; igitur pro re extra significata^
per subiectum illud.
[5.8] Tertium exemplum est de subiecto istius propositionis Ήomo
est substantia, quae dicitur de subiecto et non est in subiecto'. Ibidem
enim in Praedicamentis^5 habetur quod substantia secunda non sit in
subiecto sed dicitur de subiecto. Si dicatur quod subiectum istius stat
pro conceptu, quia sensus propositionis est quod de homine significa-
tive sumpto praedicatur hoc praedicatum "substantia," quae dicitur de
subiecto et non est in subiecto;—isto modo respondet Ockham ad
istud exemplum et ad praecedentia in prima parte Tractatus sui de
logica, capp. 32 et 34-46 Contra: tune habetur propositum quod haec
propositio sit vera prout subiectum supponit significative pro re extra,
quia non supponit personaliter, quia Aristoteles non consideraret
43. Aristotle Categories 5 (2b8-9). Compare William Ockham Expositio in librum
Praedicamentorum Aήstotelis 8, ed. Gedeon Gal and Brown, Opera philosophica 2 (St.
Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute, 1970), pp. 176-177.
44. significata/signata P
45. Aristotle Categories 2 (la20-21). Compare William Ockham Expositio in librum
Praedicamentorum Aήstotelis 4 (Gal 149-154).
46. Rather chapters 42-43 (Boehner 118-132).
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istam 'Sortes est substantia quae est dicibίlis de subiecto et non est in
subiecto' eo quod negat hoc a substantiis primis; igitur stat simpliciter.
Si dicatur^ quod dici de subiecto est praedicari, sed praedicari non
convenit rei extra; ad istud dicetur infra.^8
[5.9] Quartum exemplum est de subiecto istius propositionis Έqui-
nitas nee est de se una nee plures', et similiter de subiecto istius
propositionis Ήumanitas non est de se Sortes nee Plato', et sic de
singulis.
[5.10] Et similiter de subiecto huius propositionis Ήumanitas non
requirit per se quod ipsa sit Sortes vel Plato', et sic de singulis.
[5.11] Ad primum istorum dicit Ockham, in Primo, distinctions
secundae quaestione quinta versus finem,49 quod per illam propo-
sitionem intelligitur quod nee unum nee plura cadit in deftnitione
equinitatis. Contra: eadem ratione haec est vera Ήumanitas nee est
de se una nee plures', et similiter ista propositio 'Animal rationale vel
animalitas rationalitas nee est de se una nee plures', et tamen istam
ultimam propositionem non contingit sic glossare, quia animalitas
rationalitas non habet definitionem, quia sic definitionis esset definitio
in infίnitum.
[5.12] Ad secundum dicίtur eadem quaestione:50 cum dicitur quod
'Natura humana non est de se Sortes' aut sumitur ibi subiectum per-
sonaliter; sic est propositio vera pro Platone, et similiter sua subcon-
traria vera pro Sorte: 'Natura humana est de se Sortes'. Aut sumitur
simpliciter pro5 1 conceptu; sic vera est, quia universalis conceptus ille
non est de se Sortes. Contra: licet haec propositio sit vera 'Natura
humana non est de se Sortes'52 prout subiectum supponit personaliter
pro Platone, tamen ista propositio non est vera si subiectum supponat
personaliter 'Natura humana nee est de se Sortes nee Plato nee
Cicero', et sic de singulis. Haec enim est falsa 'Plato non est de se
Sortes nee Plato',53 et sic de singulis. Nee stat ibi subiectum pro
conceptu, quia haec copulativa est vera 'Natura humana est de se
47. Compare William Ockham Summa bgicae 1.32 (Boehner et al. 94-95).
48. See below, no. 8.2.
49. William Ockham Saiptum in I Sent. 2.6 (Brown & Gal 219).
50. William Ockham Scήptum in I Sent. 2.6 (Brown & Gal 198-200).
51. Sorte. . .pro om.(hom.) P
52. Contra. . . Sortes om.(hom.) P
53. nee Cicero. . . Plato om. P
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realis humanitas extra et tamen natura humana nee est de se Sortes
nee Plato' et sic de aliis. Et sicut subiectum primae partis istius
copulativae supponit pro re extra, ita et subiectum secundae partis
istius copulativae supponit pro re extra.
[5.13] Quintum exemplum est de subiecto istius propositionis
Ήomo est primo animal rationale', Ήomo est primo risibilis', et sic de
consimilibus. Hie dicit Ockham, in prima parte Tractatus de logica, cap.
65 5 4 quod Philosophus intelligit quod "risibile" praedicatur convert-
ibiliter de homine et "animal rationale" praedicatur convertibiliter de
ista intentione "homo," et ad istum intellectum subiectum supponit
pro ipsa intentione animae; et idem dicit in Primo, distinctionis se-
cundae quaestione quarta.55 Contra: non sufficit quod praedicatum et
subiectum convertantur ad hoc quod praedicatum primo praedicetur
de subiecto, nam si nullum animal esset nisi homo, adhuc haec non
esset vera Ήomo est primo compositus ex corpore et anima sensitiva';
sed haec esset vera 'Animal est primo compositum ex anima sensitiva
et corpore', 5 6 et tamen "homo" et "compositum ex corpore et anima
sensitiva" converterentur. Item, ad hoc quod haec sit vera Ήomo
est primo risibilis' non sufficit quod "homo" et "risibile" convertantur
sed requiritur quod "risibile" conveniat rei significatae per subiectum
in quantum est homo et quod non conveniat alicui nisi in quantum
ipsum est homo, et per consequens ad hoc quod haec sit vera Ήomo
est primo risibilis' requiritur quod iste terminus "homo" supponat pro
re extra cui conveniat risibilitas ex hoc quod ista res est homo et non
nisi quia ipsa est homo.
[6.0] [OPINIO AUCTORIS]
Quantum igitur ad istud videtur aiiter dicendum quod
suppositio personalis est57 quando terminus supponit sic pro indi-
viduo singulari quod de eius conceptu proprio natum est praedicatum
illius propositionis verificari, ut cum dicitur quod Ήomo currit' hie
54- William Ockham Summa bgicae 1.66 (Boehner et al. 202-203).
55. William Ockham Scήptum in I Sent. 2.4 (Brown & Gai 99-152).
56. sed. . . corpore om. P
57. suppositio . . . est om. F
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subiectum supponit pro Sorte pro quo est haec vera 'Sortes currit\
Suppositio materialis est ista qua subiectum supponit pro signo rei
extra, ut Ήomo est nomen', 'Conceptus est qualitas'. Sed suppositio
simplex pro re extra est ilia qua subiectum sic supponit pro re ex^
tra quod praedicatum non est natum verificari de proprio conceptu
illius rei extra, sicut posita sunt exempla praecedentia, et multa alia
possent poni. Potest enim dici uno modo sic: quod iste homo et est
Sortes et est homo et est animal, et sic de aliis. Tune cum dicitur
quod humanitas nee est de se Sortes, nee de se Plato, et sic de
aliis, sicut nee de se unum vel plura, dici potest quod subiectum
istius propositionis supponit pro ilia re in quantum est homo et sibi
repugnat respectu illius praedicati supponere pro ilia re in quantum
est Sortes, ideo haec non est vera 'Sortes non est de se Sortes nee
Plato', et sic de aliis, et eodem modo de ista propositione Animal
est substantia secunda', et sic de consimilibus. Alio modo potest
dici quod licet natura humana pro qua subiectum illius propositionis
supponit sit realiter Sortes, quia tamen supponit pro ea tali suppo^
sitione cui non repugnat formaliter quod natura pro qua supponit
esset communis, ideo illud praedicatum non est natum verificari de
proprio conceptu Sortis. Assumptum patet, quia haec consequentia
non est formalis 'Subiectum illius propositionis supponit pro natura
humana, igitur supponit pro Sorte vel58 Platone et sic de aliis', et
per consequens oppositum consequentis non repugnat formaliter an-
tecedenti, scilicet quod subiectum illius propositionis supponeret pro
natura humana, et tamen nee supponeret pro Sorte nee Platone, et
sic de aliis.59 Vel tertio modo potest dici quod verum est dicere quod
subiectum illius propositionis supponit per se pro natura humana et
non
6 0
 est verum dicere quod supponit per se pro Sorte; immo magis
esset verum dicere quod sibi repugnat supponere per se pro Sorte,
ideo etc.
[6.1] Patet igitur quod suppositio simplex est ilia pro re extra qua
subiectum propositionis sic supponit pro re quae est realiter singularis
quod praedicatum illius propositionis non est natum verificari pro
prio conceptu singularis propter causas dictas. Nee istud debet esse
extraneum tenentibus oppositum, quia ipsimet, ut videtur, habent
58. vel/pro add. F
59. e t . . . aliis om. F
60. non om. F
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hoc concedere sicut tactum est. Ipsi61 concedunt istam propositionem
Όe conceptu communi substantiae sumpto significative praedicatur
secunda substantial. Quaero igitur utrum conceptus communis sub'
stantiae, quando sumitur significative, sumitur pro substantia reali
communi extra animam, et hoc negant; aut sumitur significative pro re
singulari, et tamen de eius conceptu proprio sumpto significative non
praedicatur secunda substantia secundum eos; igitur habent concedere
quod de conceptu communi rei singularis sumpto [significative] pro illo
singular! praedicatur aliquod praedicatum, et tamen illud praedicatum
non potest vere praedicari de conceptu proprio eίusdem singularis.
[7.0] [INSTANTIAE GUILLELMI DE
OCKHAM]
Contra:62 subiectum istius propositionis 'Conceptus ho-
minis praedicatur de pluribus differentibus numero' non supponit per^
sonaliter nee materialiter, igitur simpliciter, et per consequens quando
terminus supponit simpliciter tune supponit pro conceptu et non pro
re extra.
[7.1] Item, probo quod subiectum istius propositionis Ήomo est
species' non supponat pro re extra, quia "esse speciem" est intentio
secunda sicut "praedicari de pluribus," sed intentio secunda non
venit rei significatae.63
[8.0] [RESPONSIONES AD INSTANTIAS]
Ad primum istorum potest dici sicut solet dici a mul-
tis6^ quod duplex est suppositio simplex: una qua terminus supponit
simpliciter pro re extra sicut in exemplis suprapositis, et alia qua
61. Namely William Ockham Summa fogicae 1.72 (Boehner et a l 222).
62. William Ockham Summa logicae 1.65 (Boehner et al. 198).
63. non. . . signifΐcatae om. P
64- For example, Walter Burleigh, for whom see Brown, "Walter Burleigh's Treatise
De suppositionibus and its Influence on William Ockham," Franciscan Studies 32
(1972): 35-36.
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terminus supponit pro voce communi vel conceptu vel scripto in
ordine ad significatum suum respectu praedicati quod est intentio
secunda. Secundum istud concederetur quod ibi supponat suppositione
una simplici, tamen praeter illam est alia suppositio simplex pro re
extra, ut dictum est.
[8.1] Aliter potest dici quod triplex est suppositio materialist una
qua subiectum propositionis supponit pro voce vel conceptu vel
scripto non in ordine ad aliquod significatum, ut cum dicitur Ίste
conceptus "homo" est qualitas', Ήaec vox "homo" est sonus'; alia qua
subiectum propositionis supponit pro voce vel conceptu vel scripto,
licet in ordine ad significatum, et isto modo potest dici in proposito
quod est suppositio materialis. Nee istud videtur magnum incon-
veniens, nam respectu passionis grammaticalis subiectum supponit
materialiter et tamen pro voce vel conceptu vel scripto in ordine
ad significatum, ut cum dicimus quod ' " H o m o " est nomen substan-
tivum', ' "Homo" est nomen significativum'.6^ Tales enim praedica-
tiones verificantur pro signis in ordine ad significata sua et tamen
ibi est suppositio simplex. Ita, ut videtur, potest dici in proposito
de passionibus logicalibus, ut cum dicimus quod 'Conceptus hominis
praedicatur de pluribus', quod hie subiectum supponit materialiter et
tamen supponit pro uno signo, scilicet conceptu, aliquo m o d o 6 6 in
ordine ad significatum suum. Tertio modo diceret qui vellet, ut tactum
est supra, quod subiectum illius propositionis supponit personaliter,
quia subiectum illius propositionis est actus reflexus et supponit sig-
nificative pro actu recto qui est res extra 6 7 singularis in essendo, licet
sit communis in significando; et praedicatum illius propositionis est
natum vere praedicari de proprio conceptu illius actus recti, igitur
est aliquo modo suppositio personalis. Quiscumque istorum trium
modorum ponendi detur non est magna cura quantum ad propositum,
quia in proposito sufficit quod aliqua sit ponenda suppositio simplex
respectu rei extra animam.
[8.2] Ad secundam obiectionem potest dici quod aliquid dicitur
praedicabile de pluribus uno modo quia ipsum realiter per entitatem
propriam natum est esse pars propositionis sequens copulam, et isto
modo res extra non dicitur praedicari sicut nee subici; et sic
65. significativum/signatum P
66. modo om. F
67. extra/vera P
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sumitur "praedicari" in obiectione immediate praecedente cum dicitur
quod 'Conceptus hominis praedicatur de pluribus'. Aiio modo sumitur
"praedicari" pro "significari68 per se et primo per praedicatum quod
praedicatur de pluribus." Et isto modo convenit rei extra, nam verum
est dicere quod natura humana per se et primo significatur69 per
conceptum hominis seu per istam definitionem "animal rationale,"
quae definitio nata est praedicari de pluribus. Unde sicut res extra
dicitur cognoscibilis quia nata est significari per cognitionem, ita res
extra dicitur praedicabilis quia per se et primo nata est significant
per praedicatum.
[8.3] Consimiliter est dicendum de specie cum dicitur Ήomo est
species'. Aut enim sumitur ibi "species" pro illo quod praedicatur de
pluribus eo modo quo pars propositionis praedicatur, et tune patet
quod subiectum istius propositionis supponit pro voce vel conceptu
vel scripto; aut prout est idem quod per se et primo significari per
praedicatum quod est pars propositionis communis multis, et isto
modo res extra est species sicut humanitas; aut propositio ilia valet
istam Ήomo est natura quaedam specifica' et sic adhuc convenit rei
extra. Ex isto patet illud quod tactum est supra, primo exemplo, quod
eadem res extra ex hoc quod est Sortes est substantia prima et ex hoc
quod est homo est substantia secunda, et similiter ex hoc quod est
animal, et sic de consimilibus. Et eodem modo de tertio exemplo: ex
hoc quod est homo7 1 convenit sibi per se et primo quod sit dicibile
de substantia prima ista et ilia ad intellectum praedictum, sed ex hoc
quod est Sortes non convenit sibi hoc.
[8.4] Aliter adhuc posset dici si homo vellet quod aliter distinguit
suppositiones artifex realis et aliter artifex sermocinalis, nam artifex
realis considerans de rebus extra intelligit per suppositionem sim-
plicem illam qua terminus supponit pro re singular! extra, et tamen
praedicatum illius propositionis non est natum verificari de proprio
conceptu illius singularis; et intelligit per suppositionem personalem
illam, scilicet, qua terminus supponit sic pro re extra singulari quod
praedicatum est natum verificari de proprio conceptu illius singularis;
et intelligit per suppositionem materialem illam qua terminus supponit




71. est substantia [lin. 11] . . .homo rep. P
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pro illo in ordine ad significatum sive non. Logicus autem qui est ai>
tifex sermocinalis intelligit per suppositionem personalem sicut prius,
sed per suppositionem simplicem intelligit illam qua terminus supponit
pro signo in ordine ad significatum et hoc respectu praedicati quod
est passio logicalis, cuiusmodi est intentio secunda, sive illud signum
pro quo subiectum supponit sit vox sive conceptus sive scrίptum, ut
Ήomo est72 species'. Per suppositionem materialem intelligit illam
qua subiectum supponit pro signo rei tarn respectu praedicati gram^
maticalis, ut Ήomo est nomen' quam etiam respectu praedicati quod
non convenit sibi in ordine ad significatum,73 ut Ήomo est vox',
ita quod artifex realis omnem suppositionem, vocet suppositionem7^
materialem qua terminus supponit pro signo rei sive illud signum
sit vox sive conceptus sive scriptus et hoc tarn respectu praedicati
logicalis quam respectu praedicati grammaticalis quam etiam repectu
praedicati quod non 7 5 convenit signo in ordine ad significatum, et
ideo apud eum omnis suppositio simplex est pro re extra; non sic
logicus, ut dictum est.
[9.0] [ARTICULUS SECUNDUS]
Secundus igitur articulus huius quaestionis est solvere
quaestionem.76
[9.1] [OPINIO GUILLELMI DE OCKHAM]
Ad quam dicit Ockham, ubi prius, distinctionis quartae
quaestione prima,77 quod iste terminus "Deus" ex modo suo signify
candi solum supponit pro supposito, tamen ratione praedicati adiuncti
supponit pro natura ex usu loquentium introducto ad vitandum er-
rores et ad exprimendum identitatem summam quae est ibi. Et ideo
quando praedicatum solum convenit supposito tune solum supponit
72. est om. P
73. signίficatum/signatum P
74. vocet suppositionem om.(/ιom.) F
75. non om. F
76. quaestionem om. P
77. William Ockham Scήptum in I Sent. 4.1 (Brown & Gal 12-13).
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pro supposito, et quando convenit naturae, solum supponit pro natura.
Tune ad quaestionem: haec propositio est vera Όeus generat Deum',




Contra: dubium est utrum respectu cuiuslibet praedi*
cati convenientis naturae possit iste terminus78 "Deus" supponere pro
natura, quia dicimus quod natura Patris est communicata Filio a Patre
et tamen isti non concederent istam Όeus Patris est communicatus
Filio a Patre'.
[9.3] Similiter, per Magistrum, distinctione 34, cap. "Hie consίd-
erandum"79 haec est vera 'Una est essentia trium personarum', non
tamen ista Όeus est trium personarum'.
[9.4] Secundo, aliud est diminute dictum: quod subiectum solum
supponat pro supposito80 quando praedicatum solum convenit suppos*
ito, quia tune ita esset propositio universalis vera sic dicendo Όm^
nis Deus generat Deum' sicut haec indefinita, quia non declarant81
quare illud praedicatum arctet magis subiectum ad solum standum
pro uno quam arctet signum universale ad solum distribuendum pro
uno. Similiter, forte non concederent istam Όeus non est trinus et
unus', licet concederent praedicatum solum convenire supposito. Hoc
forte non concederent ne daretur aliis occasio errandi.
[10.0] [OPINIO AUCTORIS]
Aliter igitur potest dici ad quaestionem dupliciter: uno
modo per praedicta quod propositio est absolute vera, nam ubi
78. terminus/tres P
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terminus supponit personaliter ibi propositio82 est vera si praedicatum
natum est veriftcari de proprio conceptu illius pro quo subiectum
supponit. Sed ita est hie, quia subiectum istius propositionis Όeus
generat Deum' supponit pro prima persona, de cuius proprio conceptu
veriftcari potest hoc praedicatum "generans Deum" sic dicendo: Ίsta
persona non producta generat Deum', igitur etc.
[10.1] Unde iuxta praedicta contingit de divinis triplicem suppO'
sitionem praedictam assignare, ut videtur. Aliquando enim terminus
supponit simpliciter de divinis, ut cum dicitur Όeus est tres personae
et quaelibet earum'. Ideo in talibus paralogismis est fallacia ex83 varia
suppositione: Όeus est tres personae et quaelibet earum; Deus est
Pater; igitur etc', quia in prima propositione subiectum supponit sim-
pliciter et in secunda supponit personaliter pro Patre. Aliquando etiam
supponit personaliter, ideo variatur suppositio in talibus paralogismis:
Ήic Deus est Pater; hie Deus est Filius; igitur Pater est Filius', quia
subiectum primae propositionis supponit personaliter pro Patre et in
secunda supponit personaliter pro Filio. Aliquando etiam supponit
pro signo, ut cum dicimus quod 'Conceptus8^ Dei est qualitas', et sic
etiam fiunt paralogismi sic arguendo: Ήaec sapientia divina est per
se primo modo dicendi per se sapientia; sed haec sapientia divina est
haec iustitia divina; igitur haec sapientia divina est per se primo modo
dicendi per se haec iustitia divina'. Subiectum enim minoris supponit
pro re extra, quia denotatur quod sapientia divina et iustitia divina sint
una res extra. Sed subiectum maioris supponit pro una propositione,
quia iste est sensus: haec propositio 'Sapientia divina est sapientia'
est praedicatio per se primo modo dicendi per se. Hie enim subicitur
iste terminus85 "haec propositio" et supponit pro hac propositione
'Sapientia divina est sapientia'. Et similiter, sic arguendo Όeus est
Pater ingenitus; Deus est terminus communis; igitur Pater ingenitus
est terminus communis', subiectum primae propositionis supponit pro
re extra, sed subiectum secundae propositionis supponit pro conceptu
vel alio signo rei. Patet igitur quod ista propositio potest concedi Όeus
generat Deum', quia subiectum supponit personaliter pro re de cuius
proprio conceptu veriftcatur "generans Deum."86
82. propositio/propositione P
83. ex om. P
84. pro Filio [lin. 12] . . .Conceptus om. P
85. terminus/tres P
86. Patet [lin. 2 7 ] . . . Deum om. F
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[11.0] [INSTANTIAE]
Contra: primo, quod87 conceptus Dei supponit ibi pro
hoc Deo qui est simul tres personae, igitur propositio est falsa. As-
sumptum patet, quia conceptus Dei primo significat hunc Deum, sed
primo supponit pro suo primo significato, igitur etc.
[11.1] Secundo, conceptus Dei non supponit pro Patre nisi quia
Pater est ipsa deitas, et per consequens deitas est primum significatum
illius conceptus. Aut igitur supponit ibi pro deitate, igitur deitas gen-
erat Deum; aut non; tune non supponit pro Patre, quia si non supponit
pro suo primo significato non supponit pro secundario significato.
[11.2] Tertio, quia idem significant Όeus generat Deum' et Όeitas
generat deitatem', quia concretum et abstractum idem significant; sed
una istarum est falsa, igitur alia.
[11.3] Quarto, indefinita est vera pro aliquo individuo. Si igitur
haec sit vera Όeus generat Deum' non sufficit dicere quod sit vera
pro persona sed requiritur quod sit vera pro aliquo individuo. Sed hie
non potest dare individuum nisi "hie Deus" qui est trinitas et pro illo
non est propositio vera, igitur etc.
[11.4] Quinto, melius salvantur veritates theologicae et melius vi'
tantur difficultates in oppositum exponendo propositiones in quibus
praedicantur notionalia de essentialibus per propositiones alias in
quibus praedicantur essentialia de notionalibus, ut in proposito di-
cendo quod haec praedicatio Όeus generat Deum' valeat istam '
erans est Deus' et 'Genitum est Deus'.88
[12.0] [RESPONSIO AD INSTANTIAS]
Dicendum quod istae obiectiones licet valeant contra
illos qui ponunt quod propositio ista est primo vera pro hoc Deo, non
tamen valent contra me.
[12.1] Dixerunt enim aliqui89 non solum quod "deitas" aliquo
modo in re distingueretur a qualibet personarum sed etiam quod iste
87. quod/quia P
88. et . . . Deus om. P
89. John Duns Scotus Ordinatio 1.4.2.1.11-13, ed. Commissio Scotistica, Opera
Omnia 4 (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis, 1966), pp. 5-7; Lectura in I Sent. 4.1.4-7,
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terminus "hie Deus" primo significat illam rem ut sic distinctam a
personis et quod pro hoc Deo sic sumpto est haec primo vera Όeus
generat Deum\ Contra istam opinionem valent illae obiectiones, quia
tune ista propositio esset falsa Όeus generat Deum' eo quod haec
est falsa Όeitas generat deitatem'; et similiter haec est vera Trimo
generans distinguitur a primo genito', quia nihil primo generat se. Si
igitur "hie Deus" esset primo generans tune "hie Deus" distinguere-
tur a se.
[12.2] Obiectiones autem illae non sunt contra me. Ad primam
illarum dicendum quod subiectum istius propositionis Όeus generat
Deum' supponit pro prima persona. Et ad probationem dicendum
quod Pater est primum significatum illius subiecti pro quo scilicet ilia
propositio est vera, et hoc sufftcit ad propositum. Sicut enim est verum
dicere quod conceptus specificus hominis primo significat hominem
et non significat90 per se et primo Sortem, et tamen significatum illius
conceptus pro quo ista propositio est vera Ήomo currit' est Sortes, ita
licet sit verum dicere quod conceptus specificus Dei per se et primo
significet Deum et quod non significat91 per se et primo Patrem, tamen
Pater est primum significatum pro quo ista propositio est vera Όeus
generat Deum'.
[12.3] Ad secundum dicendum quod Patri convenit ex hoc quod est
Deus quod ille conceptus potest pro eo supponere, et concedo quod
non est verum dicere quod 9 2 supponat hie pro divinitate. Sed ex hoc
non sequitur quod non supponit pro Patre. Et cum dicitur de primo
significato,93 dicendum quod Pater est primum significatum pro quo
ista propositio est vera, et hoc sufficit. Unde respectu huius praedicati
non habet aliud significatum9^ cui vere conveniat.
[12.4] Ad tertium patebit distinctione quinta.
[12.5] Ad quartum: ubi idem individuum est plures personae dis-
tinctae ad veritatem propositionis indefinitae sufficit quod verificetur
pro una illarum personarum seu pro individuo illo in quantum est




92. non. . . quod om. P
93. significato/signato P
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una illarum personarum, licet non verificetur pro illo individuo in
quantum est omnes simul; ita est in proposito.
[12.6] Ad quintum: ilia opinio reprobatur a Magistro Sententiarum,
distinctione ista, de qua etiam dicetur quaestione proxima.
[13.0] [ALIA RESPONSIO AUCTORIS]
Alio modo potest responded ad quaestionem distingU'
endo: cum quaeritur utrum haec sit concedenda Όeus generat Deum\
quaero: quid vis significare? Aut enim intendis quaerere utrum persona
quae est Deus generet personam quae est Deus alia deitate; sic falsum
est. Aut intendis quaerere utrum persona quae est Deus generet aliam
personam quae est Deus eadem deitate; sic est verum.
[14.0] [INSTANTIAE]
Ut tamen istud magis appareat obicio in oppositum
primo, quia eadem ratione diceretur quod Deus distingueretur a Deo.
[14.1] Secundo, quia tune Deus generat alium habentem deitatem,
igitur generat alium ab habente deitatem, et per consequens generat
alium ab omni habente deitatem, quia negatio importata per ly alium
negat illud quod sequitur confuse et distributive.
[14.2] Tertio, quia aut generat Deum qui est Pater aut Deum qui non
est Pater. Si Deus generat Deum qui est Pater, igitur per conversionem
Deus qui est Pater est genitus. Si genuit Deum qui non est Pater, igitur
est aliquis Deus qui95 non est Pater et sic plures dii.
[14.3] Quarto, quia si sic: aut generat se Deum aut alium Deum eo
quod generat eundem Deum vel diversum; non se Deum, quia nihil
generat se, igitur alium Deum et sic plures dii.96
[14-4] Quinto, Deus genuit alium: aut igitur alium Deum, tune sunt
plures dii; aut alium non Deum, igitur genitus est non-Deus.
[14.5] Sexto, eadem ratione haec esset vera pro Filio: 'Deus non
generat Deum*.
95. est Pater est [lin. 3 ] . . . qui om.(hom.) P
96. Quarto [lin. 1] . . .dii om.(hom.) P
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[15.0] [RESPONSIONES AD
INSTANTIAS]
Ad primum istorum: non est simile, quia haec est abso
lute falsa Όeus distinguitur a Deo\ quia negatio importata in vocabulo
distinctionis negat terminum sequentem distributive et universaliter,
et ideo valet istam quae est simplicter falsa Όeus non est idem
alicui Deo\
[15.1] Ad secundum: quid intelligis? Aut quod Deus generet alium
in persona qui97 tamen habet eandem deitatem; sic potest concedi.
Et similiter quod generet aliam personam habentem deitatem. Sed
ex isto non sequitur quod genuit alium ab habente deitatem, quia
sensus est quod genuit alium a quolibet habente deitatem; sicut nee
sequitur Όeus genuit non eundem habentem deitatem, igitur genuit
non eundem alicui habenti deitatem'; patet quod non sequitur.
[15.2] Ad tertium quaeri potest: quid intelligitur? Aut sic: utrum
Deus generet Deum qui est idem Deus cum Patre; sic concederetur,
ex quo solum sequitur quod Deus genitus est idem Deus cum Patre.
Aut intelligitur utrum Deus generet Deum qui est eadem persona cum
Patre; sic est falsum, ex quo solum sequitur quod est aliquis Deus qui
non est eadem persona cum Patre, et ex hoc non sequitur quod sint
plures dii.
[15.3] Ad quartum potest similiter quaeri: quid intelligitur? Aut
enim intendunt quaerere utrum genuerit se Deum ad istum intellect
turn, utrum scilicet genuit personam quae est idem Deus cum se ipso;
et sic concederetur, nee ex hoc sequitur quod genuit se, quia sunt
personae distinctae licet sint idem Deus. Aut quaeritur utrum genuit
personam quae est idem personaliter secum; sic falsum est. Cum etiam
quaeritur utrum genuit alium Deum: aut quaeritur utrum genuit alium
qui est Deus;98 et patet quod sic. Aut quaeritur utrum genuit alium
alietate deitatis; dicendum quod non.
[15.4] Ad quintum: aut quaeritur utrum genuit alium qui est Deus;
potest dici quod sic, quia aliam personam quae est Deus. Aut quaer-
itur utrum genuit alium alietate deitatis; sic falsum est. Cum etiam
quaeritur utrum genuit alium Deum: aut quaeritur utrum genuit alium
97. qui/quae F
98. Deus/Pater P
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qui non est Deus; sic falsum est. Aut quaeritur utrum genuit alium
qui tamen non est alius alietate deitatis; sic est verum.^
[16.0] [RESPONSIONES AD
ARGUMENTA PRINCIPALIA]
Ad primum princίpale: dicendum quod haec praedicatio
non est per se primo modo dicendi per se, ut alias100 dictum est.
Nee est praedicatio per se secundo modo dicendi per se ad ilium
intellectum quo passio praedicatur de primo subiecto cum quo primo
convertitur. Licet enim iste conceptus "generare Deum" sit conceptus
primo convertibilis cum propria descriptione quidditativa absoluta
primae personae, et ideo de ilia praedicetur per se secundo modo
dicendi per se secundum opinionem illam quae tacta est in tertia
quaestione Prologi, articulo primo, in propositione101 tamen non est
conceptus convertibilis cum conceptu isto communi omnibus personis
cum dicitur "Deus," quia sic omnis qui est Deus generaret. Sed habet
se ad ilium sicut passio convertibilis cum conceptu inferiore se habet
ad conceptum quidditativum superiorem, ut patet de ista propositione
'Animal est risίbile' vel de ista 'homo generavit Platonem.' Genuisse
enim Platonem est passio convertibilis cum proprio conceptu Sortis
et praedicatur particulariter de conceptu communi hominis; ita in
proposito secundum opinionem praedictam. Et cum arguitur quod
tune est per accidens: si intelligatur quod praedicatum conveniat
subiecto per aliquod accidens seu etiam per aliquam rem distinctam
in re a deitate, sic est falsum; nee consequentia valet. Si autem
intelligatur sic quod "generare Deum" non convenit sibi in quantum
est deitas sed magis per rationem extraneam, scilicet in quantum
est talis persona, iste intellectus concederetur secundum opinionem
illam, et ideo illi rei in quantum est deitas non repugnaret non
generare Deum, sicut patet de Filio et Spiritu Sancto. Aliunde tamen
99. No reply to the sixth argument is found in the manuscripts.
100. Walter Chatton Lectura in I Sent. prol. 3.1, in Commento alle Sentence,
Probgo-qμesύon terza, ed. L Cova (Rome, 1973), lin. 745-748; Wey 168.695-697.
101. Walter Chatton Lectura in I Sent. prol. 3.1 (Cova 751-767; Wey 169.700-
716).
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repugnat, scilicet in quantum est talis persona, ideo non potest esse
sine Filio Deo.
[16.0] Ad aliud principale: conceditur quod necesse esse generat
necesse esse ad ilium intellectual quo conceditur quod Deus generat
Deum. Et cum arguitur quod tune necesse esse exigeret aliud a se:
aut intelligitur quod necesse esse102 per unam necessiatem essendi ex-
igeret necesse esse per aliam necessitatem essendi; sic falsum est, quia
sicut sit una deitas ita sit una necessitas essendi.103 Aut intelligitur
quod unum suppositum quod est necesse esse exigit aliud suppositum
quod est necesse esse per eandem necessitatem essendi. Iste sensus,
si poneretur,10^ esset concedendus. Et cum dicitur quod tune alio
circumscripto ipsum non esset105 aut intelligitur quod, alio alietate
necessitatis essendi circumscripto, ipsum non esset; sic falsum est, et
non valet consequentia. Aut intelligitur106 quod alio alietate personali
circumscripto, quod tamen est necesse esse per eandem necessitatem
essendi, tune ipsum non esset; sic est verum, quia illo circimscripto
circumscriberetur propria necessitas essendi et propria deitas, igitur
ipsummet circumscriberetur, et ex hoc non sequitur quin ipsum sit
necesse esse sicut non sequitur ipsum non esset circumscripta propria
necessitate essendi, igitur non est necesse esse modo de facto. Aliter
posset responderi distinguendo de necesse esse formaliter vel privative,
sed transeo.
102. esse/est P
103. sic falsum [lin. 5 ] . . . essendi om.(hom.) P
104- poneretur/proponeretur F
105. concedendus [lin. 9 ] . . . esset om.(hom.) P
106. intelligitur om. P. I want to thank Joseph C. Wey, C.S.B., for correcting
this edition.
